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Abstract 
 
This article reviews the ways in which Britain and the U.S. classify and analyze 
the integration of immigrants and their descendants. While both societies 
recognize racial differences in their official statistics and in the academic 
analyses of change over time, the United States tends to classify immigrants and 
their descendants by immigrant generation much more than Britain does.  The 
importance of the concept of generation in American immigration research is 
highlighted and it is suggested that studies built on the importance of generation 
can illuminate social processes of integration in Britain. The complexities of 
defining and measuring immigrant generation are reviewed, including new 
developments in the measurement of generation that take into account age at 
migration, and historical period and cohort effects.  Racial and ethnic minority 
groups formed through immigration may have very different characteristics 
depending on the average distance of their members from immigration; including 
the possibility of “ethnic leakage”, as later generation more assimilated 
individuals no longer identify with the group. 
Keywords: generation, immigration, integration, assimilation, second-generation, race. 2 
 
 
  While immigration is transforming most western democracies, scholarship 
documenting these changes cannot help but reflect the differing historical 
conditions that have shaped the destination countries where migrants settle.  
While the gap in scholarship on immigrant integration is converging between 
traditional countries of immigration such as the U.S., Canada and Australia and 
countries which have slowly come to terms with themselves as immigrant 
destinations—Western Europe and increasingly Southern Europe,  there are still 
differences in empirical data available, theoretical models to guide research, and 
traditions within stratification research that influence the scholarship that is 
produced (Alba and Waters 2011).  In this paper I describe how British and U.S. 
researchers have classified immigrant populations in their studies. I underscore 
the importance of generation in American immigration research and suggest that 
studies built on the importance of generation can illuminate social processes in 
Britain. I argue that immigrant integration can be obscured without careful 
attention to the measurement and theoretical specification of where and how 
generation matters to understanding immigrant integration.  I then discuss some 
of the complexities of defining and measuring immigrant generation and I 
describe new developments in the measurement of generation that take into 
account age at migration, and historical period and cohort effects.  These more 
refined definitions of immigrant generation would be a beneficial tool for both 
British and American researchers attempting to measure how well immigrants 
and their descendants are doing over time. 3 
 
 
Historical Patterns of Immigration to the U.S. and the U.K. 
 
Comparative studies of immigrant integration in Europe and North 
America have stressed the ways in which the U.S. and the U.K. are more similar 
to one another than to other Western European countries on a number of 
dimensions important to understanding the pattern of immigrant integration.  
Britain and the U.S. have similar citizenship regimes (civic, not ethnic), similar 
welfare states and social benefits
i, similarly flexible educational systems that 
provide more opportunities for second chances and less early tracking into 
vocational education (especially when compared with other West European 
nations such as Germany and France), some overlaps in the national origins of 
immigrants (including sizable numbers of Caribbean blacks, Indians and 
Chinese) and  similar attention to race as an important source of division in 
society (Loury, Modood and Teles 2005; Alba, Sloan and Sperling 2011). 
  The countries also have some important differences—a much longer and 
more prominent role for immigration in American history as opposed to British 
history, the presence of a large population of native African Americans in the 
U.S., the much greater role of Muslim immigrants in British society,  the presence 
of the European Union in the British case, and the role of the long land border 
with Mexico and the large dominance of Latino immigrants in American 
immigration flows.  Indeed the most pressing and complex immigration issue 
facing American society today is the presence of 11 million undocumented 4 
 
immigrants in the United States, approximately 7 million of whom are Mexicans.  
While Britain also has an undocumented population it is much smaller, both 
relatively and absolutely.  
While the U.S. has been a magnet for immigrants from many different 
countries, Britain drew most of its immigrants in the latter half of the 20
th Century 
from former colonies.  This colonial legacy was quite important in shaping 
expectations among immigrants of full inclusion in the society and in shaping the 
immigration laws and bureaucratic directives that allowed people into the country.  
It has also been important in shaping the statistical system that classifies the 
population leading to a system based more on measuring race and ethnicity 
rather than immigrant generation. In recent years Britain has begun receiving 
immigrants from Eastern Europe, especially Poland, and asylum seekers who 
may not come from former colonies, perhaps leading to different kinds of 
accommodation among immigrants in the future (Vertovec, 2007). 
  
Measurement of Race in the U.S. and U.K. 
 
It is the attention to race and the definition of groups as ethnic and racial 
minorities in both the U.S. and Britain that most differentiates them from other 
Western European countries coping with integration of immigrants and their 
descendants.  The United States has classified post 1965 immigrants in racial 
terms, based on a system of classification and social identification that arose out 
of internal population dynamics owing to a long history of slavery and to the 5 
 
conquest of American Indians and Hispanics in the Southwest and Puerto Rico 
(Waters, 2008).  When Asians started to arrive as immigrants in the late 19
th 
Century they were racially classified by the federal government and their racial 
exclusion was ultimately enshrined in American immigration law until the 1950s.  
In an ironic turn of events the classification of the population by race that had 
been developed in order to discriminate and exclude, was officially enshrined in 
our federal statistical system after the Civil Rights Movement resulted in 
legislation designed to prevent and prosecute discrimination, and is now most 
vigorously defended by racial minorities themselves.  
 The development of anti-discrimination legislation was also incorporated 
into British society.  Modeled after the U.S. race and civil rights establishment, 
Britain has developed a policy based on multiculturalism and anti-racism to 
integrate immigrants and their descendants.  Thus while Britain and the U.S. 
often perceive their “immigration” integration issues as race relations issues, this 
is very different from other Western European countries.  France explicitly forbids 
collecting data on race and nationality and in Germany the sharp divisions that 
surround immigration are understood to be about birthplace, citizenship and 
ethnic belonging, rather than skin color. Yet this common language of race as an 
organizing principle of difference in Britain and the U.S. can obscure some real 
differences in what the two countries mean by “race” and in the social 
construction of ethnicity and in the drawing of group boundaries. 
One possible difference between the U.S. and the U.K. has to do with the 
“color line” in both societies.  In the U.S. there is a vigorous debate occurring 6 
 
about the key dividing line in American society. (Gans 1999; Foner and 
Fredrickson 2004; Lee and Bean 2010).  This debate centers on the question of 
whether the key division in American society is between whites on the one hand 
and non whites on the other, or whether the division is between blacks and non-
blacks.  In other words, the question is whether Asians and Latinos are being 
incorporated into American society onto the “white” or the “black” side of what 
W.E.B. Du Bois (1903) famously called “the color line”.  Before the Civil Rights 
movement and mass immigration from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the position of Latinos and Asians was closer in many ways, even legally, to 
African Americans, than to whites.  Recently, many scholars have argued that 
the high rates of intermarriage, residential integration of Asians and light skinned 
Latinos has meant that the serious ramifications of race for life chances in the US 
are concentrated among those socially identified as blacks, not those identified 
as non-whites. (Waters, 2008, Lee and Bean 2010, Kasinitz, 2004). 
In the U.K., the key distinction might be more clearly drawn between white 
British and other non-whites.  Patterns of acceptance and social identification 
continue to posit a common “minority” experience, encapsulated in the term BME 
or blacks and minority ethnics.  In addition blacks are not uniformly more 
separate from whites than Asians are in Britain.  Indeed on certain key indicators 
including intermarriage and residential integration black Caribbeans and black 
Africans are more integrated with whites than are Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 
(Peach 2005). This is very surprising to Americans who learn about it, since 
newly arrived immigrants from all over the globe quickly integrate with whites on 7 
 
these measures at higher levels than African Americans, despite their presence 
for hundreds of years, and their cultural similarities with native whites. 
The U.S. does not have a flow of “white” European immigrants 
comparable to recent immigration to the U.K. The flow into Britain from 
elsewhere in Europe includes professional and highly educated workers from 
elsewhere in the European Union, as well as blue collar and unskilled workers 
from Eastern Europe.  The non-professional workers moved into parts of the 
U.K., especially rural areas outside of the southeast near London and outside of 
the industrial northwest and midlands, that have not previously dealt with 
immigrants. In that sense these “new immigrant destinations” are similar to 
places in the American South and Midwest that have received large numbers of 
Latino immigrants in the last decade (Massey 2008).  These new immigrant 
destinations also have no history of accommodating immigrants and they 
struggle with integration and diversity issues. In both countries language issues 
are at the forefront as well as the burdens on schools that have to accommodate 
new influxes of immigrant children.  A key difference is that in the U.K. these new 
immigrants are white and in the U.S. Latinos are perceived as being racially 
different.  No comparative research has yet been conducted on these new 
immigrant destinations in both countries but the similar shocks to rural areas and 
yet the different racial backgrounds of the immigrants would yield very interesting 
comparisons. Until now the official discourse in Britain has tended to focus on 
“visible”, racial minorities, with the historical exception of the Irish of course, who 
were once a highly stigmatized group.  Whether these low skilled European and 8 
 
white immigrants will come to be seen as a “problem” or as a “minority” remains 
to be seen. 
 
Models of Integration and Assimilation 
 
  Comparative studies of immigration and ethnicity in the U.S. and Europe 
have become more numerous in recent years but the field is still in its very early 
stages.  Two issues plague comparative research—different theoretical and 
analytical frameworks and a lack of comparable data and statistical definitions.  
Morawska (2008; 2009) argues that scholars in the U.S. and Europe talk past 
each other in debating the usefulness of the concept of assimilation.  American 
researchers widely use the term to refer to “a multiplace, multipath, context-
dependent process of incorporation of immigrants and their offspring into the 
economic, civic-political, and social institutions and culture of different segments 
of the host society” (Morawska 2008:468).   This modern concept of assimilation, 
fleshed out in detail in the major theoretical book by Alba and Nee (2003) is most 
decidedly a two way process in which immigrants change American society as 
well as being changed by it. 
  Yet European scholars continue to see the term assimilation in a negative 
way, interpreting it as it was used in the early 20
th Century as a one way 
requirement of immigrants that they “melt” into American society by giving up 
their ethnic distinctiveness.  Morawska argues that European scholars often use 9 
 
the term “integration” to invoke the same process of mutual accommodation that 
American scholars refer to with assimilation.   
  In either case both European and American scholars have recognized the 
complex multicultural nature of the societies into which immigrants are 
assimilating.  The American concept of “segmented assimilation” reflects this 
complexity. (Morawaska, 2008:470).  This concept allows for the analysis of what 
parts of the host society immigrants and their descendants are joining.  Portes 
and Zhou’s (1993) theory of segmented assimilation asserts that immigrants can 
join the mainstream middle class, or can assimilate into a predominantly African 
American segment trapped in urban poverty and often referred to as the 
“underclass”.   They further argue that assimilation has been decoupled from 
mobility—assimilating into the host society might mean upward or downward 
social mobility over time.   
Favell  (2001)  correctly  argues  that  the  nuts  and  bolts  of  empirical 
comparisons of how immigrants and their descendants are doing in European 
societies “must be related systematically back to the political construction of the 
problem in each country”  Favell described the state of immigration research in 
Britain at the turn of the 21
st century as “significantly out of step with the rest of 
mainland Europe”.  This was because Britain had less large scale quantitative 
research on immigrants and their integration into the society, than other countries 
such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany.  The important OPCS volumes 
on  ethnicity  in  the  1991  census  ignored  generational  differences  (with  the 
important exception of Heath and McMahon who found that second generation 10 
 
ethnic minorities were significantly less likely to be employed in the “salariat”
ii 
than their white British peers and thus suffered an “ethnic penalty” in the labor 
market.)
iii  (Heath  and  McMahon,  1996:91)    The  important  series  of  studies 
sponsored by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) (Daniel  1968, Smith 1977, Brown 
1984  and  Modood,  Berthoud  et  al.  1997)  only  rarely  mention  generational 
differences—though  the  fourth  PSI  study  does  briefly  look  at  generational 
differences. 
Mostly though British quantitative research has focused on ethnic 
minorities, self identified using the categories developed for the census, without 
attention to generational change (Favell 2003).   This developed out of the 
“conceptual history that has always looked for its normative inspiration to 
American race relations of the 1960s and has always defined Britain more 
narrowly as a country of post colonial immigration only.”  
 
Data Availability: Census Categories in Both Countries 
The theories of immigrant assimilation developed in the U.S. during the 
twentieth century highlighted generational change as the yardstick to measure 
changes in immigrant groups. The first generation (the foreign-born) were less 
assimilated and less exposed to American life than were their American-born 
children (the second generation), and their grandchildren (the third generation) 
were in turn more like the core American mainstream than their parents.  
Empirically this generational progress was found for European origin groups for 11 
 
language, education, income, and residential assimilation and for patterns of 
intermarriage (Lieberson and Waters 1988; Alba, 1990). 
 
Much of this research was possible because the American census which 
had always asked people where they were born also asked a birthplace of 
parents question from 1870 until 1970, and this information allowed researchers 
to track changes between the first and the second generation. These were the 
data by which legions of scholars documented changes in residence, language 
use, intermarriage, occupation and income from the immigrant generation to their 
native born children (Lieberson 1980). By 1980, the number of first and second 
generation European immigrants had dwindled and there was an interest in third 
and later generation ethnic groups.  The birthplace of parents question was 
replaced with an ancestry question in 1980 so the ability to identify the second 
generation in census data was lost.  Since the legacy of studying immigrant 
integration by generation was well established by the time post 1965 immigrants 
began to come of age scholars mounted studies to collect original data on the 
second generation to make up for the lack of census data (Portes and Rumbaut 
2001; Kasinitz et. al. 2008; Bean et.al. 2010).  In addition, the recognition that a 
new second generation was coming of age prompted the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) to add a birthplace of parents question in 1994.  While the CPS is 
a large sample survey designed to measure employment variation by month, it 
does not have a large enough sample size to study the second generation by 
ethnic group with the exception of Mexican Americans who are numerous 12 
 
enough to analyze generational progress (Perlmann 2005; Smith 2003; Luthra 
and Waldinger 2010). 
In Britain the long standing political concern with race mapped onto an 
academic concern with social class among social scientists working there. Social 
science research in the U.K. has had a strong tradition of documenting and 
explaining divisions in British society around social class.  Thus British 
quantitative social science has been at the forefront of measuring social class 
and class mobility across generations (Goldthorpe, 1987).  As the number of 
international migrants and their children increased in British society starting in the 
1960’s scholars studying social class began to look at class mobility among 
ethnic and racial minorities alongside the white English.  These studies of ethnic 
and racial disadvantage, and the class mobility of ethnic minorities discuss 
“ethnic penalties” owing to discrimination, but did not ordinarily look at 
generational progress or spheres beyond socioeconomic status.  There has been 
much less attention to the classic questions of American immigration assimilation 
theory—generational change, and cultural and structural assimilation. This 
makes it difficult to ascertain if different trends exist by generation, or if the 
finding on ethnic minorities refer equally to the first, second and subsequent 
generations.  
Most studies of Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Chinese, Black-
Caribbeans, and Black-Africans in Britain, until the 2000s had studied these 
ethnic minority groups largely as an undifferentiated mass, or decomposed them 
by the older and younger generation. The privileging of race and ethnicity as 13 
 
independent variables in mobility research in Britain meant that immigrants by 
generation over time had received less attention, although this has been 
changing in the last decade. 
  When survey and census data were not available to identify respondents 
by generational status the history of each ethnic minority, especially their periods 
of mass emigration and arrival into Britain helped in attempting to determine what 
proportion  might  be  second  generation,  but  this  approach  is  not  entirely 
satisfactory.  The addition of birthplace and birthplace of parents questions in 
national statistics is necessary for documenting long term integration. 
Fortunately, a number of studies have begun to introduce generation as 
an important variable and of course the present volume is a great step forward.  
There are some great resources for the study of ethnic minorities in Britain such 
as the 1993/1994 National Survey of Ethnic Minorities and the Millenium Cohort 
Study which has a significant over sample of ethnic minority groups   
 In addition to the lack of generational data in national statistics and the 
limits this has put on studies of the second generation, discussion of the second 
generation in both Britain and the U.S. has pointed to the context dependent 
nature  of  the  theories  that  guide  research.    For  instance,  similar  patterns  of 
adaptation in schooling are clear in both Britain and the U.S. but Britain lacks the 
population  of  native  born  African  Americans  who  are  so  important  to  the 
segmented assimilation theory (Warikoo 2011).  So too, some scholars such as 
Kasinitz  and  colleagues  (2008)  have  pointed  to  the  role  of  affirmative  action 
programs to explain the educational success of the second generation in the US.  14 
 
Britain does not have such a program yet does seem to have similar patterns of 
educational mobility for the second generation.  It remains to be seen whether 
the  existence of  an  ethnic penalty  in  Britain  is in  part  due  to  the  absence of 
affirmative action type policies. 
 
The Concept of Generation and its Measurement 
 
  The experience of European immigrants in the U.S. in the twentieth 
century was sharply defined by the cutoff in immigration that occurred as a result 
of the Depression and the restrictive immigration laws of the 1920s. This 
restriction created conditions that made generation a powerful variable. Not only 
did one’s generation define one’s distance from immigrant ancestors, but it also 
served as a proxy for birth cohort and for distance from all first-generation 
immigrants. The power of generation as an independent variable predicting 
degree of assimilation was tied, in ways few social scientists recognized, to the 
specific history of the flows of immigration from Europe. Restrictive laws passed 
in 1924 and the Great Depression largely ensured the halt of large-scale 
immigration from Europe to the United States. Thus, major studies examined the 
experience of immigrants and their descendants as they became Americans in a 
society absent of any significant immigrant replenishment. Each successive 
generation and cohort born in the United States had less contact with 
immigrants, attenuating the salience of ethnicity in their lives (Alba 1990, Waters 
1990). 15 
 
For  European immigrants  to the U.S. the “generation” served as a 
temporal gauge of immigrant group assimilation, where “generation” is the 
ancestral distance from the point of arrival in a society (Alba 1988, p. 213). Using 
generation as a temporal gauge makes sense when examining the experiences 
of groups for which there is no protracted immigrant replenishment, as in 
research done on the immigrants and descendents of the Great European 
Migration. Each successive generation born in the United States had less contact 
with an immigrant generation, both within and outside of the family, precisely 
because there was no significant replenishment from European countries when 
those groups were studied. An additional reason for using generation is that 
there was a high correlation between the generation of these European-origin 
individuals and their birth cohorts.  Because many European groups immigrated 
during a compressed period of time, older individuals tended to be of earlier 
generation (i.e., first and second), whereas younger people were from later 
generations (i.e. third and fourth). Thus, each generation of European-origin 
individuals also experienced American society as a birth cohort, i.e., a group of 
people who experience fluctuations in life chances and constraints at roughly the 
same point in their life cycle.  
These assumptions about generation are invalid when there is ongoing 
immigrant replenishment, as there is now, because at any point in time each 
generation is a mix of cohorts and each cohort has a mix of generations. 
Individuals from different generations but of the same birth cohort, then, may 
experience similar shifts in life chances that society offers (because they are in 16 
 
the same birth cohort), even if they experience a different dynamic internal to the 
ethnic group (because they are from different generations). As Alba (1988:214) 
notes, “[T]he generational perspective tends to deflect attention from the 
structural basis of ethnicity, the linkage between ethnic group and the economy 
and the polity of the larger society, and to focus instead on the internal dynamic 
of change”. 
This observation of the American case also applies to many groups in 
Britain. While much immigration, especially the East African Asian migration for 
example, was quite concentrated in time, there has been continual replenishment 
especially for Pakistani and Bangladeshis groups because of ‘family reunion’ 
(often arranged marriages with new migrants from the home country).  The 
division of respondents by generation may be much sharper and more socially 
relevant therefore for some groups than for others.  The case of Mexican 
Americans might be especially relevant for groups such as British Pakistanis and 
British Bangladeshis who have mixed generational households. 
Using generation also sometimes homogenizes an immigrant generation 
that comes from sending countries that are very different over time.  While both a 
newly arrived 18 year old Pakistani arriving in Britain to attend university in 2012 
and an 80 year old who left Pakistan soon after its creation in 1947 would both 
be classified as “first generation”, the Pakistan they left behind is quite a different 
society and the Pakistani identity and culture they carry with them reflects these 
changes.  They are of the same “immigrant generation” but very different 
historical generations. 17 
 
In a landmark study of generational change among Mexican Americans, 
Telles and Ortiz (2008) recognize that generation for a group like Mexicans with 
a  long continous history of immigration can be measured in a number of ways.  
They distinguish between generation-since-immigration, and family generation.  
Because they have a longitudinal study which began in the 1960s with different 
generations of Mexican Americans, they can look at change over generations 
since immigration, as well as changes within families—from grandparents to 
parents to children.  In some cases the original grandparents in the 1960s study 
were themselves second generation.  Thus they show family generational 
progress over time—from grandfather to father to son, as well as documenting 
stalled progress for Mexican American third generation respondents who do not 
show convergence with native whites. 
In a reanalysis of these data Alba, Jimenez and Marrow (2013) argue that 
it is important to think about the different historical periods that current Mexican 
second generation people lived through.  The current Mexican second generation 
includes older people who grew up in a segregated society in the 1920s and 30s 
where de jure discrimination against Mexicans was practiced, and young people 
who came of age in a post industrial, affirmative action era where de jure but 
certainly not de facto discrimination had ended. They argue that intermarriage 
and mixed ancestry characterize later generations of Mexican Americans, and if 
those more assimilated later generation respondents are not captured in surveys, 
the relative success of the group might be underestimated.  This is because 
there is a link between higher educational attainment, mixed ancestry. 18 
 
intermarriage and geographic mobility” (Alba, Jimenez and Marrow 2013:19).  
Duncan and Trejo (2011) and Alba and Islam (2009) find that this “ethnic 
leakage” of the children or grandchildren of Mexican immigrants who are better 
educated and more likely to be intermarried no longer identifying as Mexican or 
Hispanic at all can lead to large differences in the characteristics of the Mexican 
American population (see also Emeka and Agius Vallejo 2011) .  These 
successful and often intermarried later generation Mexican Americans disappear 
into the native white category, and the later generation Mexican group who 
continue to identify as Mexican appear less successful than they actually are.  
Qualitative studies have also found that there are many choices occurring among 
the descendants of immigrants about how much to identify with different 
ancestries, with strong evidence that these choices may bias quantitative 
estimates of social stratification and assimilation (Waters 1999; Jimenez 2010; 
Agius Vallejo 2012). 
This process of ethnic decline through identity choices could also explain 
the diverging demographics of the descendants of Irish immigrants in the U.S. vs. 
Britain. Irish was added to the 2001 census after the Commission for Racial 
Equality in the mid 1990’s recommended the inclusion of the Irish in ethnic 
monitoring and issued a report documenting discrimination against the Irish.  The 
number of people choosing to identify as White-Irish on the British census is 
much smaller than what one would expect given the large numbers of migrants to 
Britain from Ireland in the post World War II period.  Most of those who chose 
White-Irish were first generation immigrants—people born in Ireland.  Thus many 19 
 
second, third and later generation people of Irish ancestry in Britain no longer 
identify as Irish, at least in the census.   
In the U.S. the census does not allow people to identify as Irish on the 
race question but the ancestry question does allow people to state their ethnic 
ancestry in an open-ended question. The “stickiness” of Irish identity is quite 
evident as Irish is a wildly popular identity (Waters 1990; Alba 1990).  Hout and 
Goldstein (1994) analyzed these data and found many more people identifying 
as Irish on the 1990 American census than one would expect given historical 
numbers of immigrants and natural increase.  Their article, entitled “How 4.5 
million Irish Immigrants came to be 41 million Irish Americans” argued that the 
large number of people identifying as Irish was due to the offspring of 
intermarriages between Irish and non Irish disproportionately claiming Irish as 
their identity.  While both the U.S. and Britain have histories of anti-Irish 
discrimination, it is a distant and often forgotten memory in the U.S. and whereas 
it is more salient and recent history in Britain—especially in Northern Ireland of 
course where there remains a major issue of Catholic disadvantage and 
prejudice, as well as in Scotland where there is also some evidence of ongoing, 
albeit declining, anti-Catholic prejudice.  (On Northern Ireland see Li and O’Leary 
2007; on Scotland see Abbotts et al 2004.) 
 
  In Britain where the Afro Caribbean population has high levels of 
partnering (if not always formal marriage) with whites this process might also be 
progressing.  In later generations with more intermixing, when does an individual 20 
 
no longer identify as “mixed” on the census and is that related to socioeconomic 
characteristics?  Would a generational approach to all of the ethnic and minority 
groups in Britain show some of this “ethnic leakage” into the mainstream white 
population?  A recent study by Muttarak and Heath (2010) find that intermarriage 
increases in the second generation for all groups in Britain, even those who are 
known to be more endogamous than other groups (Indians, Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis.)  They also find that for some groups such as the Indians, the 
higher the education the more likely the individual will outmarry.  This implies that 
over a few generations there could be significant ethnic demographic loss of 
identity such as that observed among Mexicans in the US. 
  Another important strand of research in the U.S. has examined the 
intersection of lifecourse and age at migration with generational measures for the 
first generation.  The research on the second generation in recent decades has 
not followed a consistent pattern in identifying the children of immigrants.  Many 
studies such as the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study and the New York 
Second Generation Study have included in the “second generation”, children 
born abroad of immigrant parents who immigrated in childhood (Kasinitz et.al. 
2008; Portes and Rumbaut 2001).  Because of the limitations of census data 
described above, Perlmann (2005) for instance uses arrival at very young ages 
as a proxy for the second generation in his study of Mexican Americans.  
Rumbaut (2004) coined the term 1.5 generation and further described the 
fractional 1.25 and 1.75 generation to describe children who came before formal 
schooling at age 6 (1.75 generation), and those who came after age 12 but 21 
 
before age 18 as the 1.25 generation. He defined children who came between 6 
and 12 as the 1.5 generation.  This division made theoretical sense, as it divided 
children into categories based on their exposure to the host country—the 1.75 
generation had all their formal schooling in the host country, the 1.5 generation 
arrived in middle childhood, and the 1.25 generation arrived in adolescence, 
when most of them would never learn to speak the host language without an 
accent and at a time in which some patterns of beliefs and behaviors have 
become set. 
While some sociologists have used Rumbaut’s classification, there has 
been no agreed upon definition of where the cut off points should be. Myers, Gao 
and Ameka (2009) note that without a strong tradition of classification, different 
methods have proliferated.  They note that “sociologists have treated 1.5ers as 
late arriving members of the second generation.  Economists have treated them 
as early arriving members of the first generation”.     
  Two recent American studies have investigated whether a continuous or 
categorical measurement of age at arrival is a better approach for assessing its 
impact on different dimensions of assimilation.  Myers, Gao and Ameka (2009) 
examined this question for Latinos and Lee and Edmonston (2011) examined it 
for Asians.  Both analyses show that using years since immigration or a 
continuous measure for “exposure” to the host society was most accurate.  They 
both did not find much support for the threefold categorization proposed by 
Rumbaut (2004).  For Latinos, Myers and colleagues suggest splitting the 
population into people who arrived before age 6, between 6 and 9, between 10 22 
 
and 12, and between 13 and 17.  Lee and Edmonston (2011) recommend a split 
at 5, 9 and 12.    Both analyses find strong effects on host country language 
attainment and educational attainment for age at arrival.  For Latinos, 
“immigrants who arrive prior to the age of six are six times as likely to complete 
high school and nearly 14 times as likely to speak English very well in adulthood 
compared to Mexican immigrants who arrive as teens.”  (Myers, Gao and Ameka 
2009:225).  Age at arrival is similarly important in affecting language and 
educational attainment among Asians.  Lee and Edmonston caution that since 
immigrant groups differ in age at arrival, these compositional effects are driving 
some of the differences in these outcome variables across groups. (Lee and 
Edmonston 2011:557). 
  Heath and Kilpi-Jakonen (forthcoming) have examined the effects of age 
at arrival on educational outcomes in OECD countries using PISA data.   They 
find that there is a “late arrival penalty” for educational achievement where late 
arriving children do worse than early arriving children.  But they also find that 
there is no cutoff age that best captures this effect.  Instead of a categorical 
approach they suggest that the log of the years in the destination country works 
best in predicting host country language attainment.  This echoes the work of  
Myers Gao and Ameka (2009) that a continuous measure is best for capturing 
age of arrival effects. 
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  A simple categorization of the immigrant population by generation yielded 
a great deal of evidence of patterns of assimilation for European ethnic groups in 
the 20
th Century in the U.S.   The children and grandchildren of the post 1965 
immigrants are also influenced by generational change, intersecting with their 
racial classification as Latino, Asian, Black or White.  In addition, recent research 
has pointed to three modifications to the concept of generation, given the more 
complex relationship of age period and cohort in current immigration as 
compared with European immigrants and their descendants in the first half of the 
20
th Century. 
  First, researchers should be careful about the use of synthetic cohorts 
from cross-sectional data on immigrant generation to infer patterns of 
assimilation.  When historical cohorts face very different societal receptions (as is 
the case with Mexican Americans), the experience of the elderly second 
generation surveyed today may be very different than the experience of the 
second generation who are now schoolchildren when they are surveyed when 
they are older.  Historical cohorts as well as cross sectional cohorts, or as Telles 
and Ortiz (2008) state, “family generation”, as well as “generation-since- 
immigration” should be measured and distinguished. 
  Second, researchers should check for or be aware of “ethnic identity 
leakage”.  Over one or two generations it is likely that the best educated, most 
socially and geographically mobile people are most likely to intermarry and have  
mixed ancestry children.  By the third or fourth generation these descendants 
could change their identities and disappear statistically from the group.  This 24 
 
would bias generational measures of assimilation or integration if the “missing” 
ethnic group members share social and economic characteristics with each other 
that are different from the characteristics of those who stay identified with the 
group. 
  Third, since children develop rapidly, and in country schooling and the 
ability to learn the host country language without an accent differs by age at 
arrival, the experience of the children of immigrants is likely to differ by this 
important variable.  The fractional generation categories of 1.25, or 1.5 or 1.75 
can be employed if that is all that is available, but a continuous measure of age 
at arrival is even better at capturing this effect.  Recent work suggests that care 
should be used in choosing these cutoff points, and that they be related to the 
dimension of assimilation that will be measured. 
  The American scholarly literature on assimilation of immigrants and their 
children most definitely shows that on many dimensions change occurs over the 
course of several generations.  Descendants of Afro Caribbeans in the U.K. are 
mostly third and fourth generation at this time.  Many Asian groups are second 
and third generation, and new groups from Eastern Europe are primarily first 
generation.  In addition to the rich data on social class and self identification that 
have been analyzed, a moving picture of British integration should include 
generational changes over time. 
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i Britain is still more generous than the US but the two countries are much less 
generous than established European welfare systems. 
ii “The salariat or service class consists of salaried employees such as managers, 
administrators, or professionals, have relatively secure employment, an 
incremental salary scale, fringe benefits (e.g pension schemes), and significant 
promotion chances” Heath and McMahon (1996:92). 
iii Their analysis excluded second generation Chinese and Bangladeshis because 
of negligible numbers. 